Vulnerability disclosure
Reporting
Section titled “Reporting”Email security@z4j.com. PGP key: see SECURITY.md in the repo.
Include:
- Description of the issue.
- Steps to reproduce (minimal repro preferred).
- Affected version(s).
- Your contact info for follow-up.
Please do not
Section titled “Please do not”- File a public GitHub issue.
- Post to public mailing lists / chat rooms / social before we’ve had time to respond.
- Demonstrate the issue against systems you don’t own.
Safe harbor
Section titled “Safe harbor”We follow the disclose.io baseline. You may research in good faith - we won’t pursue legal action for:
- Testing on your own self-hosted brain.
- Testing against our public dev/demo instance (if/when we host one).
- Accidental access to data during good-faith research - with prompt disclosure.
We will not take legal action against researchers who:
- Stop testing on discovery.
- Don’t exfiltrate data beyond what’s needed to prove the bug.
- Don’t disclose publicly before our patch is available.
Response timeline
Section titled “Response timeline”| Event | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledge receipt | 48 hours |
| Initial triage | 5 business days |
| Patch for critical | 7 days from triage |
| Patch for high | 30 days |
| Patch for medium/low | 90 days |
| Coordinated public disclosure | 90 days from patch, or immediate if already disclosed |
Credit
Section titled “Credit”We publish a SECURITY_HALL_OF_FAME.md in the repo, with researcher name (or pseudonym) and issue summary. Bug bounty is not currently offered; happy to recognize publicly and in release notes.
In scope:
- Brain (z4j-brain).
- Agent packages (z4j-*).
- Wire protocol.
Out of scope:
- Third-party queue engines (report to them).
- Third-party infra (Postgres, Redis, etc.) - report upstream.
- Denial-of-service via resource exhaustion on single-tenant self-hosted brain (operator owns resourcing).
Past findings
Section titled “Past findings”Two rounds of internal audits pre-1.0 found and closed issues across authentication, session handling, and event redaction. Full details in docs/SECURITY_AUDIT_PRERELEASE.md (intentionally public - transparency).